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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  A Hypothetical Case 
“…Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”2 
 
Dr. X is a young, charismatic, board-certified surgeon at the local hospital.3  
While popular among her patients and non-surgical colleagues, to the established 
surgical “Old Guard,” she appears somewhat of a threat. Her training in new, 
advanced techniques, coupled with splendid bedside manner, has caused her practice 
                                                                
1
 J.D. 2008, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A. 1993, 
Case Western Reserve University; M.D. 1997, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Medicine. The author wishes to thank his wife, Ann, his daughters, Juliette and Savannah, and 
the rest of his family for their understanding, patience, and support. He also wishes to thank 
his legal writing professors and mentors without whose guidance this would not have been 
possible. 
2
 Lord Acton, Life of Mandell Creighton, in POWER QUOTES 247 (Daniel B. Baker, 1992). 
3
 The case of Dr. X is a fictional illustration. However, it is modeled after the typical 
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to become quite busy. However, disruption in some well-established referral patterns 
has occurred, and business has been siphoned away from her older colleagues. 
Dr. Y is an endocrinologist at the same hospital.4  As Vice President of Medical 
Affairs (VPMA), he is also a paid administrative agent of the hospital. Dr. Y is close, 
both personally and professionally, to several of the “Old Guard” surgeons. They 
express concerns about the negative impact Dr. X is having on their practices. Not so 
subtly, they let Dr. Y know that if something is not done, they will probably start 
moving their elective cases across the street to the local hospital’s competitor. Dr. Y, 
in his VPMA capacity, is very concerned about the impact this would have on his 
hospital’s bottom line. 
When an untimely, perioperative complication lands Dr. X in front of a surgical 
morbidity and mortality5 peer review, Dr. Y seizes his opportunity. Besides this 
particular event, it also appears that Dr. X has had a few bad outcomes related to 
some of her “new” surgical techniques, has been occasionally tardy in starting her 
cases, and is significantly delinquent in completion of her medical records. The 
physician peer review committee, composed of administrative-friendly and “Old 
Guard”-sympathetic peers, votes to recommend suspension of Dr. X to the local 
hospital’s governing board. As they do in nearly every instance, the Board adopts the 
peer review committee’s recommendation. Dr. X is suspended. 
Dr. X’s response to the suspension of her hospital privileges is to retain an 
attorney and sue the hospital and the peer review board. Unfortunately for Dr. X, the 
trial court’s ruling for summary judgment for the defense is affirmed on appeal; the 
peer review committee and hospital are immune from civil liability under the federal 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), as well as applicable, 
similar state provisions.  
In the meantime, Dr. X’s suspension has been reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank,6 and she has been unable to acquire privileges at any other 
hospitals. Thus stigmatized, she is considering giving up medicine altogether. The 
tremendous time, effort and resources expended in the making of a physician will be 
lost.7  Also left in the lurch are Dr. X’s patients, practically all of whom thought she 
was an outstanding surgeon. 
This hypothetical—but not uncommonly recurring—fact pattern demonstrates the 
destruction of a promising medical career, elimination of competition, promotion of 
                                                                
4
 Dr Y. is a fictional character. 
5
 Morbidity and Mortality reviews (usually referred to as “M and M’s”) are typically case 
conferences where adverse patient outcomes (including death) are presented and evaluated. 
6
 The National Practitioner Data Bank, as created by the Health Care Quality Improvement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, title IV, 100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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7
 The time investment usually requires four years of undergraduate education, followed by 
four years of medical school, followed by three to five years in residency, then possibly 
additional time in a fellowship. The average medical school graduate has $150,000 or more in 
debt, and gives up the additional opportunity costs of a higher paying job where average 
annual residency salaries are roughly $40,000 a year. By comparison, a starting associate at a 
law firm, after three years of law school, may command a salary of $80,000-100,000 a year. 
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status quo cronyism, and protection of bad faith peer review, without a scintilla of 
evidence that quality healthcare has been advanced in the process. Certainly, such 
perverse consequences were not what Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon had in 
mind when he introduced the HCQIA in 1986.8  Unfortunately, when policy 
decisions supported by the weight of the law create both unfair and inequitable 
results that trample physician property and due process rights, permit conflicts of 
interest and abuse of process, and fundamentally harm the public interest, then the 
question must be asked:  is physician peer review immunity justified? 
B.  Thesis and Organization 
Simply defined, physician peer review is the process whereby doctors evaluate 
the quality of their colleagues’ work product in order to assure that prevailing 
standards of care are being met.9  However, because physicians who serve on peer 
review committees “make neither money nor friends,”10 Congress passed the HCQIA 
and most state legislatures passed similar provisions providing immunity from civil 
liability for peer review participants.11 Unfortunately, despite its good intentions and 
intuitive attractiveness, physician peer review immunity represents a fatally flawed 
policy whose time for revision has arrived. Because physician peer review immunity 
is ineffective for its intended purpose, ripe for administrative abuse and offensive to 
notions of due process and fundamental fairness, it should be abandoned before it 
causes more harm. 
Part II of this article describes the physician credentialing and peer review 
process, then examine the rationale for the HCQIA and similar state statutes as well 
as protections the law provides for the peer review process.12 Part III illuminates the 
erroneous threshold assumption that undergirds the entire justification for physician 
peer review immunity: specifically, that physician peer review is a competent and 
capable tool for improving the quality of health care. In Part IV, this article evaluates 
whether this legislation has been effective in achieving its purposes. Part V utilizes 
recent and relevant case law to demonstrate exactly how physician peer review 
immunity operates to disadvantage the aggrieved plaintiff physician, how it may be 
subverted to the ulterior motivations of economic credentialing,13 and how it may 
ultimately threaten rather than improve overall health care quality. Finally, in Part 
VI, the article presents a comprehensive “de-immunized” approach to physician peer 
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 Jack R. Bierig & Robert M. Portman, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 977 (1988). 
9
 George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial 
Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723 (2001). 
10
 Matthew J. Cate, Physician Peer Review: Serving the Patient or the Physician?, 20 J. 
LEGAL MED. 479, 480 (1999). 
11
 Lu Ann Trevino, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or Shield?, 22 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 331 (1997). 
12
 While HCQIA and similar state provisions are generally applicable to all entities 
engaged in “professional review action,” this paper focuses on hospital-based physician peer 
review immunity. 
13
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review, which would make the system fundamentally more fair, substantially 
increase physician participation, and achieve the outcome that is the fundamental 
purpose of the entire process: improved quality of health care. 
II.  PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW 
A.  Physician Credentialing, Hospital Privileges and the Peer Review Process 
With rare exception, having privileges to admit and treat patients in a hospital 
setting is an indispensable element to a physician’s ability to practice his profession; 
some specialties are almost exclusively practiced in the hospital arena.14 The process 
an applicant physician goes through to receive hospital privileges is called 
“credentialing.” Subsequently, peer review is the “ongoing process whereby the 
facility monitors physicians’ practices to identify and remedy patterns of 
unacceptable patient care.”15 
Support for the physician peer review process is based on the intuitively logical 
premise that only a physician’s colleague or peer would possess the expertise 
appropriate to undertake such an evaluation.16 The actual peer review process 
transpires in committees composed of physicians from a hospital’s medical staff. In 
an effort to ensure impartiality, committee compositions generally include “an 
unbiased hearing officer and practicing physicians who are not in direct economic 
competition” with the reviewed physician.17 The peer review committees meet 
regularly to review quality and performance data for individual physicians for 
reappointment purposes and as needed to deal with physician incidents potentially 
adversely affecting patient care.18 While not the ultimate decision-making body, the 
peer review committee’s recommendations regarding privilege status form the basis 
upon which the hospital’s governing body makes its final decision.19 
                                                                
14
 Phillip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff 
Peer Review Law at California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 301, 302 (2004). Specifically, 
most radiologic, surgical, and interventional specialties are primarily hospital-based. 
15
 JONATHAN P. TOMES, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER REVIEW 9 (1994). 
16
 Newton, supra note 9, at 724. 
17
 Id. at 725. However, one of the inescapable realities of the peer review process is that 
almost invariably it will be contaminated with conflict of interest problems. This problem will 
likely only be magnified at smaller hospitals, which may not have a sufficiently large pool of 
unbiased peer experts from which to recruit peer reviewers. Also, where a smaller number of 
providers in a specialty and locale compete for the existing patient base, the economic 
motivations for eliminating the competition will likely increase. 
18
 BYLAWS OF THE MEDICAL STAFF OF PARMA COMMUNITY GENERAL HOSPITAL (2002). 
Reappointment to the Medical Staff occurs every two years. 
19
 Newton, supra note 9, at 725. A hospital’s governing body is generally composed of 
nonmedical laypersons. 
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B.  Rationale for Physician Peer Review Immunity 
In the wake of Patrick v. Burget,20 and premised on a finding that “there [was] an 
overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging 
in effective professional peer review,” Congress passed the HCQIA.21 With this 
objective in mind, the HCQIA was the “legislative response to the medical 
malpractice crisis” of its day.22 Concerned that state licensing boards, hospitals, and 
medical societies were not effectively weeding out incompetent and impaired 
physicians, the HCQIA sought to encourage and strengthen peer review activity by 
granting a limited immunity from damages for liability arising from peer review 
participation.23 Additionally, the HCQIA created a reporting requirement whereby 
healthcare entities such as hospitals, insurers, and professional societies were 
required to report malpractice payments and disciplinary actions to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), operated by the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and in some cases to state medical boards.24 
One of the largest deterrents to effective peer review at that time was the 
perceived threat looming over physicians and hospital administrators that they may 
be sued by a doctor that they were planning to discipline.25 In fact, testimony 
received by the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment indicated that these 
suits were having a “chilling effect” on effective peer review.26 Due to the threat of 
retaliatory and often baseless litigation by an accused physician, hospitals and peer 
review committees were reluctant to report physicians.27 In order to avoid the 
possibility of lengthy, expensive, and uncertain litigation, hospitals would often 
accept “voluntary” resignations from incompetent physicians in exchange for their 
silence as to the reason for such resignation.28 Likewise, state medical boards would 
engage in a form of “physician plea bargaining” by accepting the “voluntary” 
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 486 U.S. 94 (1988). In Patrick, the plaintiff physician received a two million dollar jury 
award after a finding that peer review proceedings had violated federal antitrust and state tort 
laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but the United States Supreme Court 
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 Bierig & Portman, supra note 8, at 987. 
22
 Id. at 979. 
23
 Id. at 977. Exempted from the HCQIA immunity provisions are actions seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief; similarly exempted are claims based on civil rights 
violations. Id. at 989. 
24
 Id. at 978. Besides the reporting requirement and immunity provisions, the third prong 
of the HCQIA was a fee-shifting component intended to discourage physician plaintiffs from 
bringing frivolous, retaliatory lawsuits after adverse peer review decisions. Id. at 1002. In 
reality, even though most defendant hospitals and peer review committees win on summary 
judgment due to HCQIA and state statutory immunity, rarely do courts find claims sufficiently 
frivolous to trigger the shifting of attorney’s fees. Trevino, supra note 11, at 330.  
25
 See Bierig & Portman, supra note 8, at 983. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. at 981. 
28
 Id. 
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surrender of a physician’s license in exchange for an agreement that the physician 
would stop practicing in their state.29 
While it was hoped that the reporting requirement would curb the undetectable 
movement of incompetent or impaired physicians from state to state “free from any 
accompanying record of incompetence or misconduct,”30 the immunity provision 
was designed to allow peer review groups to “function more effectively in combating 
the growth of the medical malpractice crisis.”31 In order to be eligible for protection 
under HCQIA, peer review actions must meet four standards:  
(1) [that peer review action is taken] in the reasonable belief that the 
action was in furtherance of quality of care (2) after a reasonable effort to 
obtain the facts of the matter (3) after adequate notice and hearing 
procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other 
procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in 
the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known 
after such reasonable efforts to obtain the facts.32 
Furthermore, the Act establishes a “presumption” that the peer review action 
meets the above criteria, “unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”33 
C.  Physician Peer Review Protections 
Besides the federal protections afforded peer review via the HCQIA, practically 
every state and the District of Columbia have sought to protect peer review activity 
through the passage of statutes that “safeguard information acquired or generated in 
the process.”34 These statutes generally provide protection of three different types: 
privilege, confidentiality, and immunity.35 Privileges protect against discovery of 
peer review records and proceedings.36 Confidentiality requires that “the parties 
refrain from disclosing information to those outside the judicial proceeding.”37 State 
immunity provisions operate similar to the HCQIA but provide varying levels of 
protection.38 The states with the strongest protections cover the hospital and the peer 
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 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. at 983. 
32
 Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes Have Helped 
Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 239, 246 (2001). 
33
 Id. 
34
 Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and Federal 
Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 546 (2003). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. at 548. 
38
 Id. 
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review committee, as well as those who testify or offer evidence. Besides providing 
immunity for civil claims, some state statutes also protect against criminal liability 
and antitrust actions.39 
Thus shielded by significant federal and state protections, physician peer 
reviewers should feel a certain degree of safety as they proceed with the discharge of 
their duties.  
III.  PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW AS A TOOL TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE QUALITY 
Unquestionably, there would be no HCQIA or similar state peer review 
protections without the firmly held belief that physician peer review is fundamental 
to improvements in health care quality. The notion that “peer review is essential for 
ensuring quality medical care”40 has become such axiomatic dogma that it is virtually 
impossible to read a review of this topic without encountering this presumption.41  
Unfortunately, evidence to support such a fundamental conclusion is entirely lacking 
and seriously undermines the legitimacy of physician peer review immunity. 
In fact, published studies specifically examining the mechanics and outcomes of 
physician peer review efforts consistently find ineffectiveness and inconsistency. At 
the core of the difficulty for physician peer review is the basic lack of agreement on 
what constitutes “quality of care.” While “no universally accepted norms for care or 
physician behavior have been developed,”42 according to one researcher, 
“[a]ppropriate care is usually defined in terms of processes such as diagnosis, 
treatment and prevention of complications.”43 However, “[r]eviewers’ judgments of 
quality … are influenced by factors other than sound processes of care.”44 Weingart 
performed a retrospective, case-controlled Medicare database analysis and found that 
physician reviewers “judged care much more harshly among cases with serious 
adverse outcomes although the care was identical in each matched case.”45 
Several other authors have studied physician agreement and peer review 
reliability as to “quality of care.” Localio found that “assessments based on medical 
records, especially when implicit and not guided by objective criteria, produce 
disagreement among physicians on the appropriateness and quality of care.”46 A 
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 Id. at 550. 
40
 Edward H. Livingston, M.D. & John D. Harwell, J.D., Peer Review, 182 AM. J. OF 
SURGERY 103, 103 (2001). 
41
 Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit—Is It Time 
For a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (1999) (“The medical community and policy-makers 
have widely accepted peer review of physicians as essential to encouraging high quality 
medical practice.”). 
42
 Judith E. Orie, M.D., Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. 
REV. 437, 444 (1998). 
43
 Saul N. Weingart et al., Physician-Reviewers’ Perceptions and Judgments About 
Quality of Care, 5 INT’L J. QUAL. HEALTH CARE 357, 357 (2001). 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. (emphasis added). 
46
 A.R. Localio et al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of 
Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 457  
(1996). 
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review by Goldman of twelve studies examining the inter-reviewer reliability of the 
standard practice of peer assessment of quality of care found “agreement corrected 
for chance to be in the range regarded as poor,” indicating that physician agreement 
regarding quality of care to be only “slightly better than the level expected by 
chance.”47 Even worse, “implicit professional reviews are … easily biased by 
extraneous circumstances or information.”48 Thus, the preponderance of the scientific 
evidence available on the subject of physician peer review reliability would indicate 
a woeful inability to credibly and reproducibly assess “quality of care.” 
The fiction of physician peer review as a useful tool to improve health care 
quality, while perhaps startling and disheartening, is not altogether surprising. 
Whenever subjective, value-laden terms such as “quality” and “standard of care” are 
discussed, difference of opinion inevitably emerges. Such ephemeral, fluid concepts 
not only vary by the subjective perspective of the individual doing the measuring 
(such as the patient, the patient’s family, or the physician), but also change with the 
passage of time. New advances in medications, treatments, and techniques constantly 
raise the “standard of care” bar and adjust the concept of “quality care.”49 
Nevertheless, the unassailable fact that physician peer review is a “poor” tool for 
quality assessment and is reproducible hardly greater than “chance,” deals a serious 
blow to the rationale upon which physician peer review immunity is founded. 
Despite its wishful thinking, Congress should realize that the policy decision 
favoring immunization of the physician peer review process only makes sense if its 
fundamental assumptions about the process itself are actually sound. 
IV.  EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION 
In spite of the preceding facts, and thanks to a broader movement towards the 
abrogation of privileges and immunities generally, Congress and state legislators 
have endorsed a policy choice made between competing interests.50 While 
simultaneously favoring the laudable policy of improving the quality of health care, 
the protections afforded the peer review process exact “a social cost,” by adversely 
affecting the interests of the peer review plaintiff.51 
In order to sustain this imposition, some evidence should exist that these policies 
actually accomplish their objectives.52 Unfortunately, there is no such evidence. Not 
only is there a conspicuous absence of any proof of efficacy, evidence to the contrary 
                                                                
47
 R.L. Goldman, The Reliability of Peer Assessments of Quality of Care, 267 JAMA 958, 
958-60 (1992). 
48
 Kieran Walshe, Adverse Events in Health Care: Issues in Measurement, 9 QUAL. 
HEALTH CARE 47, 51 (2000). 
49
 Id. at 48. Indeed, not only is the half-life of medical knowledge finite in terms of years, 
but in fact, today’s “standard of care” may be tomorrow’s malpractice. Current thinking on 
post-menopausal hormone replacement therapy for women provides a good example of this 
conundrum. 
50
 Newton, supra note 9, at 734. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Scheutzow, supra note 41, at 8. 
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indicates that physician peer review immunity has failed to improve overall health 
care quality,53 and case law illuminates its harmful potential.54 
First, although it would be quite difficult to measure and perhaps unreasonable to 
expect that a given occasion of peer review would serve to advance the overall 
interests of health care quality, it is nonetheless somewhat specious to claim that to 
qualify for immunity “the [HCQIA] does not require that the professional review 
result in actual improvement in the quality of health care, only that it was undertaken 
in the reasonable belief that quality health care was being furthered.”55 Yet, despite 
an inability to detect small incremental improvements on a case-by-case basis, it 
would be reasonable to expect measurable aggregate improvement as justification for 
peer review protection statutes. To date, however, “no exhaustive study has linked 
the imposition of medical peer review statutes of any kind with a reduction in 
medical error occurrences.”56 
In fact, the only comprehensive study to examine the efficacy of peer review 
protections found no positive relationship between the strength of state statutes and 
the number of adverse peer review actions reported to the National Practitioner Data 
Bank.57 To arrive at this conclusion, researchers collected hospital data on peer 
review activity and reporting and compared the degree of protection afforded the 
peer review process with frequency of adverse peer review reporting.58 If peer review 
protection laws were fulfilling their policy objectives, the logical expectation would 
be to see more adverse peer review actions and subsequent NPDB reporting in states 
with greater protections.59 The fact that this does not occur suggests that “such laws 
are ineffective in accomplishing their public policy objective and should therefore be 
eliminated or reformed.”60 
Additional evidence for the failure of HCQIA and peer review immunity statutes 
to advance quality health care can be inferred from reports from the Institute for 
                                                                
53
 Id. 
54
 North Colorado Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Nicholas, 27 P.3d 828 (Colo. 2001). In 
North Colorado, the court held that participants in the peer review process that resulted in the 
suspension of invasive cardiologist Nicholas for inadequate medical chart documentation were 
immune from suit and liability on state contract and tort claims. In reversing the judgment of 
the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court found that NCMC’s peer review of Nicholas 
was in accordance with HCQIA, notwithstanding the conclusion by the state Committee on 
Anticompetitive Conduct that “Nicholas’s loss of privileges was initiated by the hostility and 
anti-competitive feeling of another NCMC cardiologist, and ordered Nicholas’s invasive 
cardiology privileges reinstated.”  Id. at 833.  
55
 Fox v. Parma Community General Hospital et al., 160 Ohio. App.3d 409, 2005-Ohio-
1665, 827 N.E. 2d 787, at ¶33  (citing Moore v. Rubin, Trumbull App. No. 2001-T-0150, 
2004-Ohio-5013) (emphasis added).  
56
 Fine, supra note 21, at 827. 
57
 Scheutzow, supra note 41, at 10 [hereinafter NPDB]. 
58
 Id. The study devised a four-part classification continuum and assigned states and the 
District of Columbia to a specific category based on the scope and degree of peer review 
protections afforded. The categories ranged from “none” to “high.” 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 8. 
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Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and the Massachusetts Health Policy Forum. In the 
wake of two landmark reports published by the Institutes of Medicine in 2001, the 
IHI responded in December 2004 by launching the “100,000 Lives Campaign—a 
national initiative with the goal of saving 100,000 lives among patients in hospitals 
through improvements in the safety and effectiveness of health care.”61 The 
Massachusetts Health Policy Forum likewise corroborated that “between 44,000 and 
98,000 Americans die annually as a result of medical error,”62 and that in 
Massachusetts alone between one and two thousand preventable deaths occur 
annually.63 While immunity for physician peer review may not be the cause of these 
medical error rates, it would seem to indicate that the improvement in quality health 
care that Congress and state legislatures were banking on to justify that grant of 
immunity in the mid and late 1980’s still has not materialized. 
V.  THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND COSTS OF IMMUNITY 
A.  Bad Faith Peer Review  
Besides being a health care quality improvement failure, physician peer review 
immunity may serve as a significant shield for bad faith peer review. Accusatory 
physicians who are involved in the peer review process “are easily able to 
manipulate the process to achieve ulterior motives, such as eliminating the economic 
competition in a particular practice field.”64 And while the current peer review 
process allows participants the protection to “practice arbitrary peer review with little 
fear of repercussion,” the severely disadvantaged victim of bad faith peer review 
faces an almost insurmountable uphill battle.65 The cases of Fox v. Parma 
Community General Hospital66 and Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum 
Health67 illustrate such suspect peer review. 
                                                                
61
 Donald M. Berwick, MD, MPP, FRCP, et al., The 100,000 Lives Campaign—Setting a 
Goal and a Deadline for Improving Health Care Quality, 295 JAMA 324, 324 (2006). The two 
Institute of Medicine reports were To Err Is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm. A “life 
saved” for the purposes of the campaign was defined as a “patient successfully discharged 
from a hospital who, absent the changes achieved during the campaign, would not have 
survived.” The campaign sought to have U.S. hospitals implement “6 highly feasible 
interventions”:  deploy rapid response teams; deliver reliable evidence-based care for acute 
myocardial infarction; prevent adverse drug events through medication reconciliation; prevent 
central-line infections; prevent surgical site infections; and prevent ventilator-associated 
pneumonia. 
62
 David L. Fine, The Medical Peer Review Privilege in Massachusetts: A Necessary 
Quality Control Measure or an Ineffective Obstruction of Equitable Redress? 38 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 811, 814 (2005). 
63
 Id. 
64
 van Geertruyden, supra note 32, at 253. 
65
 Id. at 252. 
66
 See Fox, supra note 55. 
67
 Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum Health, Trumbull App. No. 2003-T-
0136, 2004-Ohio-5108. 
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In Fox, the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment 
for defendants after Fox, a general surgeon, had his privileges suspended and 
brought suit for breach of contract, defamation, unfair competition, abuse of process 
and tortious interference with business relationships.68 Despite facts that the peer 
review board “did not identify quality-of-care issues” and found no mortalities in the 
470 cases it reviewed, the appellate court upheld immunity based on the four-prong 
HCQIA immunity test.69 In upholding Dr. Fox’s suspension for what practically 
amounted to deficiencies of “medical record timeliness/documentation” and issues of 
“utilization and length of stay,” the court noted that the HCQIA test for immunity is 
an “objective test” and that “any purported bad faith or malice on the part of the 
defendants is immaterial.”70 And even though the plaintiff produced expert testimony 
which opined “that the peer review contained false, fraudulent, deceptive, and 
misleading statements impugning the quality of care rendered by plaintiff,”71 the 
court held defendants immune for “what is most fairly described as genuine 
differences in opinion regarding the preoperative status of some of the patients, their 
surgical or medical problems, [and] the best techniques for dealing with such 
problems.”72 
The holding in Fox, if not an outright endorsement of bad faith peer review and 
economic credentialing, at least makes it clear that the court is reluctant to enter the 
medical decision-making thicket and is quite content to render substantive 
complaints moot by a finding of immunity under HCQIA.73 While physicians in 
large groups or those otherwise politically well connected can often deflect 
disciplinary actions, the Fox holding ought to send a shiver down the spine of those 
less fortunately situated. Specifically, physicians new to a hospital staff, solo 
practitioners, and physicians performing novel or different procedures make “an easy 
target for those seeking to disqualify them from practicing in a hospital.”74 
In Catipay v. Trumbull Memorial Hospital Forum Health, pediatrician Catipay 
brought suit after not being reappointed to the hospital’s medical staff, alleging 
claims of tortious interference with a business relationship, breach of contract, 
defamation and violation of public policy.75 The Ohio Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
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hospital by finding that Catipay had failed to establish that the hospital and trustees 
had not made reasonable efforts to obtain the facts before taking professional review 
action against him, and that the Board of Trustees’ decision to deny his application 
for reappointment did not violate the HCQIA’s notice and hearing procedures.76 
The substance of Catipay involved a “tumultuous relationship” between appellant 
and his department head and the chairman of the Board, both of whom were fellow 
pediatricians on staff at the hospital.77 Specifically, appellant had been openly critical 
of the hospital and appellees over issues including “the hospital’s lack of a twenty-
four hour pediatric house officer to aid in the resuscitation of distressed newborns” 
and his department chief’s “refusal to serve a rotation on the house emergency 
obstetrics schedule.”78 After a verbal altercation with Dr. Khavari, the department 
chief, Khavari informed Catipay that she would not forward appellant’s 
reappointment application to the Credentials Committee unless appellant completed 
a physical and mental exam.79 
After declining the offer to be examined, and without his department chief’s 
report to the Credentials Committee, Catipay proceeded with his application for 
reappointment.80 Despite the lack of the department chief’s report, the Credentials 
Committee recommended to the Executive Committee “appellant’s reappointment 
for a probationary period of one year.”81 The Executive Committee agreed with the 
Credentials Committee and forwarded a recommendation for probationary 
reappointment to the Board of Trustees. However, the Board declined to accept the 
Executive Committee’s recommendation and instead decided to appoint an ad hoc 
committee to review appellant’s reappointment.82 Following a two-hour meeting, the 
ad hoc committee recommended to the Board that appellant not be reappointed to the 
medical staff. The Board accepted that recommendation and suspended Catipay’s 
privileges.83 
In looking completely past the merits of appellant’s case, the Eleventh District 
rejected Catipay’s assignment of error when it found that the Board was not 
prohibited “from forming an ad hoc committee for the purpose of providing an 
additional recommendation,” and that Khavari had not “exceeded her authority when 
she demanded appellant submit to a mental health exam.”84 Further, in rejecting 
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appellant’s argument that the ad hoc committee did not make reasonable efforts to 
obtain the facts, especially where it only met for two hours before making its 
recommendation to the board, and where Catipay was not even told of the 
appointment of the ad hoc committee nor interviewed by the committee, the court 
concluded that “nothing in the HCQIA or the [Hospital] Bylaws require the Board to 
notify a physician of the manner in which an investigation is being conducted, or to 
participate in that investigation.”85 
Beyond the glaring personal and economic conflicts of interest and the trampling 
of basic due process rights, the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals apparently 
had no qualms with a hospital board skirting bylaw procedures and refusing to take 
“yes” for an answer, when what it preferred to hear was “no” from a secret ad hoc 
committee. Further, by permitting physician peer review immunity to silence 
physicians willing to expose legitimate hospital patient safety issues, the 
bastardization of physician peer review immunity as a tool for the advancement of 
health care quality is complete. 
As for Dr. Catipay, perhaps he can take comfort in the knowledge that his case 
did not come before the Ohio Seventh District Court of Appeals. That court has held 
that “when reviewing whether an investigation was reasonable, courts do not require 
that such an investigation be accurate and thorough.”86 But with an individual’s 
professional livelihood hanging in the balance, perhaps they should.  
Economic Credentialing 
As alluded to in Fox, and in response to the currently upward spiraling costs of 
health care, the practice of medicine is “undergoing an economic overhaul.”87 In an 
attempt to rein in these costs, insurance companies as well as the federal government 
have targeted physicians “as the principal point for cost containment.”88 And with 
advances in information technology allowing hospitals to precisely measure 
physicians’ past economic performance with respect to patient care, hospitals may 
now “create financial and economic profiles of physicians that are ultimately used… 
in credentialing.”89 
But, while economic credentialing considers the impact a physician may have on 
a hospital financially, “it completely disregards the competence, skill and quality of 
the physician’s work.”90 Under economic credentialing considerations, a physician 
may be excluded from hospital privileges for “treating too many poor patients, for 
having privileges in a competing hospital, or for simply providing complete and 
effective care.”91 
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The American Medical Association (AMA) and other medical organizations are 
“vehemently opposed to economic credentialing.”92 When it “creates inherent 
conflicting loyalties for the physician, [who] must make a choice between the 
patient’s well being and the cost of diagnostic procedures and treatment options that 
will be reflected in his or her peer review,”93 the ethical and legal dilemmas become 
obvious. 
VI.  SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PHYSICIAN PEER REVIEW WITHOUT IMMUNITY 
“The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion.”94 
While this Biblical aphorism is usually applied in evidence law to infer guilt 
when an accused takes flight,95 this phrase seems to aptly apply to the physician peer 
review process. Otherwise, why shroud the proceedings in secrecy and cloak the 
reviewers in immunity? Given that physician peer review immunity fails its intended 
purpose of improving health care quality, it is almost as certain that merely granting 
immunity from civil liability does not assuage peer review participants’ concerns 
regarding retaliatory litigation, especially considering the stakes for the aggrieved 
physician plaintiff. Faced with an adverse peer review decision, most physicians will 
fight for their professional lives. And as the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted, “the plain meaning [of HCQIA’s immunity provision] is that 
professional review bodies and covered individuals … are immune from liability 
only… the provision does not explicitly establish immunity from suit.”96 
If physician peer review is to become the health care quality improvement device 
that everyone, including Congress, hoped that it would, the time has come for a 
major overhaul. But, can physician peer review be performed professionally and 
competently without legislative immunity? I submit that the answer is “yes.” To do 
so, I would suggest the following changes: physician peer review participation 
should be a mandatory requirement for hospital privileges; non-peer and hospital 
administration involvement in the peer review process should be eliminated or 
significantly minimized; physician peer review participation should be indemnified 
by the hospital or the state; and significant efforts need to be made to improve the 
uniformity and reproducibility of the peer review process. 
First, peer review involvement should be a mandatory requirement for hospital 
privileges. All physicians should participate for a fixed term in a rotating capacity. In 
this way, a degree of even-handed application of the process would be ensured, and 
peer review power spread evenly throughout the medical staff. Cases should be 
reviewed in a blinded fashion and/or conflicts of interest with reviewers determined 
prospectively and prohibited. 
   Second, non-peer and hospital administration involvement in the physician peer 
review process should be eliminated or at least substantially minimized. Given the 
realities of economic credentialing and the financial pressures that hospitals face 
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today, it is easy to see how hospital administrations may have economic or political 
motivations which conflict with and tend to undermine the fairness of the peer 
review process. Similarly, the use of non-peer case screeners should be strictly 
scrutinized and made to apply prospectively defined, objective criteria to the cases 
they preliminarily review.97 
Third, physician peer review participants should be insured or indemnified by the 
hospital or the state for their good faith peer review efforts. Since hospitals and the 
state are already directly benefiting from the uncompensated efforts of peer 
reviewers, it is not unreasonable for them to shoulder some of the cost. Thus, without 
fear of retaliatory financial liability, physician participation would be encouraged 
and enhanced. Similarly, an insurance fund could be established out of which 
“victims” of “bad” peer review might be compensated. 
Lastly, significant efforts need to be made to improve the scientific rigor applied 
to the peer review process to make it less ambiguous and subjective. Peer review 
outcomes need to be more reliable and reproducible if they are to create a palpable 
improvement in health care quality. At a minimum, peer reviewers should have some 
degree of education or training in the process. Just being a good physician does not 
necessarily qualify one to be a good peer reviewer. The Continuing Medical 
Education (CME) process would be an appropriate forum in which to give 
physicians some training in the process. Since state licensing requirements already 
specify fixed numbers of hours per licensing cycle,98 and most hospitals have 
Continuing Education departments and sponsor CME activities,99 creating programs 
that focus on improving the quality of work done by peer review committees should 
not be difficult. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Physician peer review is the process whereby physicians evaluate their 
colleagues’ work product. Physicians in general are less than enthusiastic to perform 
this function due to the lack of incentives and the fear of retaliatory litigation often 
following an adverse peer review decision. Federal and state legislators created 
statutory immunity for physician peer review participants in the hopes of advancing 
effective physician peer review and improving health care quality. 
Twenty years after the passage of HCQIA, there exists no data to indicate that 
this policy is effective. To the contrary, the only palpable consequences are the social 
costs being borne by individuals harmed by the granting of such immunity. Because 
physician peer review immunity is a failed policy whose harms are unjustified, the 
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time has come to abandon this approach and implement a fairer, more effective, de-
immunized peer review process.  
 
